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ABSTRACT
     Test reactors are unique in that the core configuration may change
with each operating interval. The process of safety analyses for test
reactors at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Test
Reactor Area has evolved as the computing capabilities, software,
and regulatory requirements have changed. The evaluations for
experiments and the reactor have moved from measurements in a set
configuration and then application to other configurations with a
relatively large error to modeling in three-dimensions and explicit
analyses for each experiment and operating interval. This evolution is
briefly discussed for the Test Reactor Area.
INTRODUCTION
There have been three test reactors built at the Test Reactor Area
located in the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory. They were the Materials Testing Reactor (MTR), the
Engineering Test Reactor (ETR), and the Advanced Test Reactor
(ATR). A unique feature of  test reactors is the variability of the core
configuration and the experiment loading in the core and reflector
test positions. Due to this variability the safety of each operating
interval must be evaluated and shown to be acceptable for operation.
The method for demonstrating this acceptability has changed over the
years and the tools available for the analyses have also changed.
Initially most of the evaluations for the MTR were performed
with mechanical calculators, slide rules, and pencil. Then some
computers were built. These were large and slow. Many times a large
portion of a day or days was required for an evaluation and the
computer would fill a whole building. The computers advanced in
speed and codes were written specific to the computer system in
many instances. This resulted in an increase in computing speed, but
the systems were still large. Some of the systems utilized were built
by IBM, VAX, CDC, and CRAY. Currently most of the evaluations
are performed with workstations, most of which will sit in a small
office space. The speed of calculation is very fast and large
simulations can be performed in minutes when hours or days were
previously required.
Initial safety evaluations were by necessity rather rudimentary.
The process involved solution of equations from experimental
correlations. The data sources were few in number and the direct
applicability was small. The nuclear industry was an infant. There
were some heat transfer data available from other industries, such as
manufacturing and power (steam). Most of the nuclear physics
parameters were obtained by experimental studies in critical facilities.
As the nuclear industry advanced there were many heat transfer
studies completed with various operating conditions, materials and
configurations. Codes were developed for core physics evaluations.
In most cases due to the complexity of the experimental facilities
there were simplifications to allow construction of one- or two-
dimensional models. As the industry matured the use of three-
dimensional models became available. The advances in computing
capability allowed more detail in modeling and currently large three-
dimensional models are constructed. In some cases the neutronics are
evaluated by tracking each particle generated in the fission process
until it is absorbed or lost outside of the confining boundary.
Initially the safety margins for the neutronic parameter of
greatest interest, the criticality, was evaluated by critical facility
measurements and adjustment of the fuel loading until the proper
critical position was obtained. As the data base increased the data
was fit parametrically and small programs developed. Changes in
experimental loadings and the influence on other positions were
generally ignored. If the experimenter required flux wire
measurements could be performed. However, there was a large
uncertainty due to the counting capabilities and the restrictions on
placement directly in the experiments. Today the facilities can be
modeled in detail and the excess reactivity in a configuration
predicted with very good accuracy. The influence on flux levels and
spectrum can be evaluated for each change in configuration if
required.
Large advancements in methodology and accuracy of the heat
transfer evaluations has also occurred. Early evaluations used a “hot
spot”, “hot channel” approach. The variables thought to be important
to the heat flux magnitude were identified, and the variation in this
parameter that was deemed applicable was then noted. This resulted
in a multiplier on the parameter. These multiplication variances were
then combined as a product. This product became the “hot spot”
factor, and the heat flux multiplied by the “hot spot” factor had to
remain below the critical heat flux. The process was repeated for
those parameters which would influence the enthalpy rise in the
coolant channel. The product of the factors then became the “hot
channel” multiplier. The rise in temperature times the “hot cannel”
factor added to the inlet temperature was required to be less than the
saturation temperature. Advances in computer capability, correlation
accuracy, and innovations in mathematical techniques led to a
statistical evaluation. In this process each of the identified variables
were combined statistically and the required safety margin was a
number of standard deviations from the calculated critical heat flux
or flow instability temperature.
Advances in computing capability and development of system
codes have resulted in evaluations for loss of coolant events and
establishment of specific melt and release limits. Original evaluations
bounded the consequences of these accidents by evaluation of total
melt.
I.     NEUTRONIC ANALYSIS
A.    Design Evaluations
The  initial evaluations for reactivity additions in the ATR were
performed using analog techniques.  The calculations incorporated
only the flux level scram safety action and the effects of the negative
temperature coefficient.  The reactivity insertion values were
obtained by experimental measurements in the ATR Critical Facility
(ATRC).
 Measurements in the ATRC showed that voiding a flux trap and
experiment resulted in the maximum accident consequences for a
reactivity insertion.  The evaluations showed a peak reactor power
greater than 10 times normal with an integrated energy of 130 MW-
sec(1).  The results are shown in Figure 1.
Based  on SPERT(2) and BORAX(3) transient data, the energy
deposition between the fuel and coolant was estimated as 50-50. 
This resulted in an energy addition of ~65 MW-sec in the fuel. 
Evaluations predicted that fuel plate melting would occur at the hot
spot with 50 MW-sec. A fraction of the core was expected to melt.
B.    Envelope Extension
 In the early 1970's, the primary experiment sponsor had a need
for a larger test space in a flux trap.  Safety rods were not installed in
all locations and it was concluded that a large facility could be
installed if the dummy safety rods were removed.  An extensive study
was initiated to evaluate the reactor response to the installation of this
facility.
Evaluations were performed with  one-dimensional and two-
dimensional neutron diffusion codes.  The void worth for partial to
total void in radial zones inside of the pressure tube were evaluated
with the 1-D diffusion code, SCAMP(4).
The temperature coefficients for the reactor coolant were
measured for the various zones in the fuel element in the ATRC. The
reactor response to the voiding of the flux trap or various portions
thereof was evaluated with the code PARET(5) and system response
was then evaluated with an analog simulation.
Sensitivity to uncertainties in the nuclear parameters were
evaluated. Typical results are illustrated in Figure 2.
C.     Upgraded Final Safety Analysis
 The evolution of analysis capabilities for evaluation of nuclear
reactor safety was incorporated in the ATR.  This led to many
documents and some techniques or analysis parameters not
documented in conformance to evolving requirements.  There was an
extensive undertaking to verify the safety parameters, and to
document the evaluations beginning in the late 1980's.
The fuel element power distributions were evaluated with a
three-dimensional simulation utilizing PDQ (6).  The sensitivities to
experimental loadings, fuel element type, reactor power distribution,
and control cylinder position were evaluated.  The moderator
temperature coefficient was verified with analytical techniques.  The
reactivity insertions from flux trap voiding in various radial zones
were evaluated using SCAMP. 
The reactivity insertion from the flux traps was evaluated with
RELAP5(7).  Various initiators were evaluated.  The results were
input to a model of the reactor with 24 channels for computation of
the feedback and safety rod insertion.  The solution methodology
required an interactive solution for the reactor power response.  The
procedure was to select a reactor power profile, calculate the
reactivity insertion, calculate the reactor power response, compare to
the assumed profile and repeat until the assumed response was near
the calculated response.
The reactor response to a  Condition 2 fault is shown in
Figure 3.
D.   Process Control Upgrade
The process control system was upgraded in 1992-1993.  There
was no longer a need for 9 pressurized water loops and concurrent
with the Process Control Upgrade, four flux trap positions were
identified for reconfiguration.  To preserve the approved safety
envelope, it was deemed necessary to closely match the core
reactivity and fuel element power distributions.  The core physics
analysis used the PDQ-7 two-dimensional and three-dimensional fuel
core models.
Cross section sets for PDQ-7 were developed using as a basis
ENDF/B-V(8) data.  The COMBINE(9,10) code was used  to generate
31-group cross sections for the SCAMP code.  Hafnium cross
sections for SCAMP were generated with the 94 group SCRABL(11)
code.  Diffusion cross sections for PDQ-7 were generated from the
SCAMP cross sections using the CMBTPDQ(12) code.
A comparison of the axial profiles for element 25 and 26 is
shown in Figure 4.
II.   HEATING EVALUATIONS (NON-FISSION)
Gamma heat rates were measured in the ATRC using
thermoluminescent phosphors and in the ATR using ion  chambers-
graphite-wall and aluminum wall. The uncertainty was estimated to
be -+ 20 percent.  These heating rates were used for design of
experiments in the irradiation positions until about 1990.
A large irradiation program to support the development of
targets  for the High Temperature Gas Reactor-New Production
Reactor was started in 1990. The targets were evaluated for neutron
and gamma heating using MCNP.  A quarter core model was derived
from a full-core model of ATR Cycle 73A-2, which was a flux run
conducted after a reflector change out.
Many of the NPR targets were instrumented and temperatures
were controlled with a gas mixture to vary the thermal conductivity
of a control annulus.  The tests also contained helium monitors
(HAFM’s).  This provided opportunity to benchmark the MCNP(13)
calculations.  The analytical predictions were in excellent agreement
with measured results.  This method is used for predicting neutron
and gamma heat rates in all irradiation experiments at the present
time.
III.   HEAT TRANSFER
The safety of the nuclear test reactor depends on removal of the
generated energy from the fuel element to the primary coolant.  Two
phenomena which can disrupt this cooling process are vapor
formation which results in “dryout” or departure from nucleate
boiling (DNB) due to high heat flux.  The other is a flow excursion
due to instability in the coolant channel.  This results in DNB also,
but the initiator is flow excursion due to vapor formation.  The
coolant channel geometric parameters determine the exact condition,
i.e., beginning of nucleate boiling or saturation at the channel
discharge.
A.   Design Evaluations - FSAR
Initial safety evaluations determined the safety margin by using
a “hot spot” - “hot channel” methodology.  The factors that influence
the heat flux at the hot spot were identified and an uncertainty on the
determination of the parameter value was predicted.  One such
parameter was the homogeneity of the fuel loading.  The uncertainties
were then combined as a product.  The nominal peak heat flux
multiplied by the product was then required to be less than the DNB
heat flux.
The margin to flow instability was maintained in the same
manner.  The parameters that contributed to the enthalpy rise in the
“hot stripe” were identified.  The uncertainties were quantified and a
product established.  The enthalpy rise was then multiplied by the
factor and the value had to be less than the allowable, normally the
delta in enthalpy required to reach saturation.
An example of the parameters considered and typical values are
shown in Table 1, as obtained from Bonilla(14).
The design and initial safety evaluation for heat flux used the
“hot spot” - “hot channel” approach.  The ATR used a statistical
approach based on the error propagation method (F. H. Tingey)(15)
for bulk water temperature.  The pressure, flow rate, bulk coolant,
and wall temperatures were computed using an IBM 7040 program
developed for this problem.  The results for ATR full power are
shown in Table 2.
B.   Technical Specifications
In the early 1970's the decision was made to convert the FSAR’s
for the ETR and ATR to a Technical Specification format.  A Monte
Carlo routine for statistical analysis had just been developed by W. E.
Vesely.  A simplified approach utilizing this procedure was
developed for the ETR.  The allowable damage criteria for each
category of accident as defined by RDT-C16-1T(16) was developed
and acceptable margins defined.  For anticipated events the margin
was three standard deviations to DNB or flow instability.  The
unlikely event damage criteria was defined as an energy limit for
energy in the fuel plate.  The damage criteria was energy deposition
required for liquidus and the protective margin was two standard
deviations.  The extremely unlikely fault damage criteria was chosen
as the ignition temperature, or temperature at which the molten
aluminum-uranium would burn in a water or steam environment. 
The protective margin was chosen as three standard deviations.
The conversion to Technical Specifications for the ATR was
started near the mid 1970's, as the ETR conversion was being
completed.  The instrumentation systems were being converted to a
plant protective system as defined in RDT C16-1T and design basis
analyses were required to support the chosen system, the set points ,
and to demonstrate the protective margin.
The system response to flow, pressure, reactivity and loss of
coolant was evaluated with RELAP4(17).  The Monte Carlo technique
was to be applied to ATR as previously done for ETR.  However, it
was desired to apply the boundary  conditions for core differential
pressure, reactor power, inlet temperature and pressure from the
RELAP4 analyses.
The ability to predict fuel plate behavior under various normal
and accident conditions without large conservatism required a three-
dimensional heat conduction model with hydraulic capability.  The
required analytical tool needed to accomplish the following:
1. Predict temperature distribution for any one of the 19 fuel plates
in an ATR assembly.
2. Model heat transfer processes during forced convection,
subcoded transition boiling, subcooled and saturated fully
developed boiling, and film boiling regimes.
3. Account for energy required to change material phase.
4. Model steady-state and transient hydraulics for three fuel plate
coolant channels.
5. Predict and simulate hydraulic (flow) instability and flow
reversal.
A computer program was written that interfaced with the
MITAS(18) thermal analyzer.  Later it was revised to interface with the
SINDA(19) thermal analyzer.  The numerical scheme used for solving
the field equations of the fluid flow was that employed by the
RELAP5(20) computer code, written in homogeneous form.
The results from ATR SINDA were used as the boundary
conditions for SINDA-SAMPLE which was used to calculate
thermal-hydraulic statistical margins (standard deviations to CHF,
flow instability, fuel plate buckling and aluminum-ignition
temperature) along the hot-stripe using the Monte Carlo sampling
technique.  The SINDA SAMPLE model statistical parameters are
listed in Table 3.
C.   Two Primary Pump Operation
The experimental requirements in the late 1970's resulted in
lower power levels in the ATR.  This coupled with high electrical
costs based on peak demand led to safety evaluations to predict the
allowable operating conditions with two primary coolant pumps
operating instead of three.  The limiting faults were evaluated with
RELAP5 and ATR-SINDA and SINDA-SAMPLE.
D.    UFSAR
As discussed in I.C., the thermal-hydraulic analyses were
updated during preparation of the UFSAR.  The basic methodology
using RELAP5, ATR-SINDA, and SINDA-SAMPLE was
unchanged.  Boundary conditions and damage criteria for the
Condition III (Unlikely) faults were revised.  The damage criteria for
Condition III was changed to a fuel plate temperature limit to
maintain fuel plate geometry in a coolable configuration.
SUMMARY
Safety evaluations have evolved from designs verified by testing
to meet the required criteria, with major accidents bounded by
conservative assumptions, to analytical modeling techniques that
predict plant response to all postulated faults. Large computer codes
allow prediction of the consequences for postulated faults. They
allow prediction of nuclear characteristics, such as reactivity, photon
interaction heating and activation, while others model response to
flow, pressure, loss-of-coolant, etc. These simulations are performed
on computers kept in an office and in a fraction of the time required
only a few years ago. In most cases this has resulted in the ability to
operate the test reactors in a more efficient manner, and has allowed
the experiment designs to operate closer to desired conditions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy under DOE Idaho
Operations Office Contract #DE-AC07-94ID-13223.
REFERENCES
1. deBoisblanc, D. R. and S. Cohen, Safety Analysis Report-
Advanced Test Reactor, Volume 2 of 2, IDO-17021, April 1965.
2. Haire, J. C., Subcooled Transient Tests in the Spert-I Reactor–
Experimental Data, IDO-16342 (July 1958)
3. Dietrich, J. R., Experimental Investigation of the Self-Limitation
of Power During Reactivity Transients in a Subcooled, Water-
Moderated Reactor, AECD-3668 (1954)
4. Beck, C. L., and G. E. Putnam, SCAMP- An Sn Code for
Analysis of Multigroup Problems
5. Obenchain, C. F., PARET- A Program for the Analysis of
Reactor Transients, IDO-17282 (January 1969)
6. Pfeifer, C. J., PDQ-7 Reference Manual II, WAPD-TM-947,
Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, February 1971
7. Ransom, V. H.,et. al., RELAP5/MOD2 Code Manual,
NUREG/CR-4312, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Aug
1985
8. Magurno, B. A., R.R. Kinsey, and F.M. Scheffel, Guidebook for
the ENDF/B-V Nuclear Data Files, Brookhaven National
Laboratory, July 1982
9. Grimesey, R. A.. Et. Al., COMBINE/PC- A Portable ENDF/B
Version 5 Neutron Spectrum and Cross Section Generation
Program, EGG-2589, EG&G Idaho, Inc., April 1990
10. Nigg, D.W., Development and Validation Notes-
COMBINE/PC, NRRT-N-90-018, EG&G Idaho, Inc., May
1990
11. Judd, J.L., SCRABL-5 An ENDF/B Version 5 Computer Code
for Cross Section Collapsing, EG&G Idaho, Inc., September
1991
12. Brown, A.W., CMBTPDQ Code Description, Letter to
Distribution, Br-05-86, EG&G Idaho, Inc., September 10, 1986
13. Briesmeister, J.F., ed., MCNP- A General Monte Carlo Code for
Neutron and Photon Transport, Version 4.2a, LA-7396-M,
CCC-200A, Los Alamos National Laboratory, April 1991
14. Bonilla, Charles F., ed., Nuclear Engineering, McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., 1957
15. Tingey, F.H., Error Propagation in Hot Channel – Hot Spot
Analysis. IDO-16558 (October 1959)
16. RDT Standard, RDT-C 16-1T, Supplementary Criteria and
Requirements for RDT Reactor Plant Protection Systems,
Division of Reactor Development and Technology, United
States Atomic Energy Commission, December 1969
17. RELAP4/MOD5: A Computer Program for Transient Thermal-
Hydraulic Analysis of Nuclear reactors and Related Systems,
Interim Report SRD-113-76, ANC, Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, June 1976
18. Holmstead, G.M., Martin-Marietta Interactive Thermal Analysis
System, Version 2.0( Mitas II), Users Manual, EDTM-M-76-2,
Martin-Marietta (May 1976)
19. Gaski, J.D., Old/SINDA 1983/ANSI Computer Code, Network
Analysis Associates, Inc., (Feb 10,1986)
20. Ransom, HV and J. A. Trapp, RELAP5 Hydrodynamic Model
Progress Summary- Pilot Code, PG-R-76-013, Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, Dec 29, 1976
APPENDIX
FIGURES
TABLES


